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In conventional warfare, troops depend on big picture intelligence to figure out their ground strategies, but in a counterinsurgency, troops, aid workers and others on the ground are usually the best informed about the enemy, the report said. Brigade and regional command intelligence summaries that rehash the previous days fighting are of little use compared with periodic reports that also address changes in the local economy, corruption and governance. "I don't want to say we're clueless, but we are," according to an operations officer quoted in the report. "We're no more than fingernail deep in our understanding of the environment." "The U.S. intelligence community is only marginally relevant to the overall strategy," the report concluded. When he took command in Afghanistan in June 2009, McChrystal made similar calls for collecting more "white" information about local goings-on along with "red" analysis about enemy activities. Lt. Gen. David Rodriguez, second-in-command to McChrystal, subsequently ordered regional commands to begin answering wide-ranging questions about the Afghan government and local populations. Little, however, has changed in the collection of mostly enemy-related intelligence, the report said. The report quotes McChrystal as saying in a recent meeting: "Our senior leaders, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, Congress, the president of the United States
-- are not getting the right information to make decisions with. We must get this right. The media is driving the issues."
[Associated
Press;
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