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And even though many say the outlines of a peace settlement are clear, the two sides have never resolved at least two dealbreakers: how to divide Jerusalem
-- which both want as a capital but where their people are by now significantly intertwined
-- and how to resolve the Palestinians' demand that millions of refugees and descendants be given rights to return to what is now Israel. Kacowicz, the Hebrew University professor, said mediators tend to succeed when the sides are ready to do a deal and largely know what it will be. "In a way mediators are most effective when they are less needed," he said. "When the parties are ready to reconcile between themselves, they may need good offices, or some assistance." Indeed, the Maine Democrat was successful in Northern Ireland in a situation where the two governments overseeing the Belfast talks
-- Britain and Ireland -- agreed years beforehand on the shape of a workable settlement. Success in that context mainly meant moving the key local parties gradually closer together to the point where they basically settled on what British and Irish governments saw all along as the compromise. From his arrival in Belfast, all local parties were based in same British government building. Mitchell's shuttle diplomacy involved going from room to room, floor to floor. The deal still took 26 months and required exceptional patience, but Mitchell worked in alliance with two governments and didn't have to persuade them. In the Middle East, some had hoped the United States would appoint a more interventionist mediator like the late Richard Holbrooke. And it would seem logical that the nature of the mediator makes a difference: Do they have expert knowledge or familiarity with the antagonists? Are they perceived by all as neutral? Does a track record matter? Is their personality in sync with that of the people they must nudge and cajole? Some believe it the very doggedness of the mercurial, charming Holbrooke that was key to his success. But history suggests that Holbrooke, too, was successful where the circumstances were already right. He was for a time considered a mediation magician for his success in brokering the Dayton Agreement of 1995, ending a brutal war in Bosnia that lasted more than three years but also left the two sides impoverished, exhausted, deadlocked and probably aware that they must compromise over the ethnically mixed former Yugoslav republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The same Holbrooke failed utterly to secure peace in the former Serbian province of Kosovo, even though in Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic he had one of the same protagonists as in the Bosnian mediation. The difference: Kosovo's territory was sacrosanct to the Serbs, and the ethnic Albanians of Kosovo were overwhelmingly in the majority and saw an alternative path in which Serbia is simply forced to pull out. NATO eventually attacked Serbia over the issue in 1999 and Kosovo declared independence nine years after that. In 2005, the Kosovo status issue was handed by the United Nations to former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari, who won the Nobel Peace Prize several years later for helping douse flames across a broad swath of the world from Namibia to Indonesia. But agreement on Kosovo, with Serbia involved, in the end eluded even him. In 2008, Kosovo declared independence on its own.
[Associated
Press;
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