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 Further, the CSB said industry practices recommended by the
American Petroleum Institute don't require refiners to take
necessary steps to prevent high-temperature hydrogen attacks that
form minute cracks in carbon steel like that on the heat exchanger
which ruptured at the Tesoro Anacortes refinery on April 2, 2010.
The board plans to vote on a final version of the report this year.
In a statement, Tesoro acknowledged the efforts of board
investigation teams "despite the significant and successive turnover
in the agency's assigned personnel over the years".
However, the company said it would discuss disagreements with the
board over the probe's findings once the report is approved by the
CSB.
"We respectfully disagree with several findings in the draft report
and, most importantly, take exception to CSB's inaccurate depiction
of our process safety culture," Tesoro said.
The CSB also said the Washington State Department of Labor &
Industries, which regulates workplace safety, needed tougher
standards and should perform a safety audit of the state's five
refineries.
The report suggests Washington state switch its regulatory system to
one like that in the United Kingdom which requires use of the safest
possible technology.
A similar recommendation for California by the board staff led to
sharp disagreements among the board's three members at a public
meeting in Richmond, California on January 15. Two board members
said such a radical overhaul would not ensure safer refineries and
chemical plants.
In the report about the Anacortes, Washington blast released on
Thursday, the CSB also said the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
does not enforce the use of inherently safer technology, but could
do so under its current powers.
Use of inherently safer technology was the surest way to prevent
accidents like the rupture of piping on a naphtha hydrotreater heat
exchanger at the Anacortes refinery, board Chairman Rafael
Moure-Eraso said in a statement.
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"The accident at Tesoro could have been prevented had the company
applied inherent safety principles and used
high-temperature-hydrogen-attack resistant construction materials to
prevent the heat exchanger cracking," Moure-Eraso said.
The 2010 Tesoro Anacortest explosion was the deadliest at a U.S.
refinery since the 2005 explosion at a Texas City, Texas, refinery
then owned by BP Plc.. Fifteen workers were killed in the BP
explosion and 180 others were injured.
Five workers caught in the Anacortes refinery fireball died on the
day of the explosion. Two other workers died within the following
month.
The seven workers were checking for leaks and helping with the
start-up of another, nearby heat exchanger when piping on a heat
exchanger in operation suddenly failed, engulfing them in a
fireball.
In a separate investigation completed six months after the blast,
the Washington Department of Labor & Industries found the explosion
was preventable, but came about because Tesoro did not stick to its
own guidelines for maintaining equipment.
The Chemical Safety Board investigates fires and explosions at U.S.
chemical facilities. It does not possess regulatory or law
enforcement authority. It does make recommendations to governments
and industries about improving practices and standards.
(Reporting by Erwin Seba in Houston; editing by Matt Driskill and
Jason Neely)
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