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			 Even before Sunday's news that a health worker who treated the 
			Dallas case had herself contracted the disease, officials 
			acknowledged they need to do more. 
 Reuters checks with health departments in six states and cities that 
			have large West African communities, Philadelphia, Boston, New York 
			City, Minnesota, New Jersey, Maryland and Rhode Island, show that 
			they are scrambling to adapt those generic plans to Ebola.
 
 If they are not able to stay one step ahead of any cases, then 
			lapses that characterized Ebola patient Thomas Eric Duncan’s 
			treatment in Dallas could recur. In the Texas case that led to 
			unnecessary exposure to the victim.
 
 “To think the first patients would go flawlessly are an 
			overestimation of our systems,” said Dr. Craig Smith, medical 
			director for infectious disease at University Hospital in Augusta, 
			Georgia. “I would expect there would be a few stumbles.”
 
 As it turned out, those stumbles included infection of a Texas 
			health worker who treated Duncan. The infected worker, identified as 
			a woman but not named by authorities, is believed to be the first 
			person to contract the disease in the United States.
 
 
			
			 
			In terms of preparedness around the United States, there is a lot to 
			do: hospital drills, 911 emergency operator guidelines, quarantine 
			rules, even details such as checking that plastic body bags meet the 
			minimal thickness - 150 micrometers - recommended by the U.S. 
			Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
 
 “It takes a certain amount of reverse engineering to get the plan to 
			where it can respond to new, emerging threats,” said political 
			scientist Chris Nelson, an expert on public health systems at Rand 
			Corp.
 
 While departments contacted by Reuters said they were confident they 
			would be able to identify, treat and contain Ebola, "nobody is 
			charged with reviewing all 2,800 departments' plans," said Jack 
			Herrmann, chief of public health programs at the National 
			Association of County & City Health Officials.
 
 Among the lapses in Dallas, even before the case of the infected 
			health worker, were the hospital's failure to admit Duncan when he 
			first went to the emergency room and told staff there of his recent 
			arrival from Liberia, delaying his treatment by at least two crucial 
			days. It took almost a week to clean the apartment where he stayed. 
			And health officials briefly lost track of a homeless man who they 
			were monitoring for Ebola symptoms.
 
 “We're learning from what's going on in Dallas, too," said Dr. Jay 
			Varma, a deputy commissioner at the New York City Department of 
			Health. "We have a plan that we think is strong but we don't have 
			the final answers to a lot of questions."
 
 While the CDC advises states on 15 “preparedness capabilities” they 
			need to respond to public health emergencies, the list was last 
			evaluated in 2011 and is fairly general— “emergency operations 
			coordination” and “information sharing”.
 
 Local health departments have varying capabilities, preventing the 
			CDC from crafting a single national plan, so it provides guidelines. 
			Thus local authorities decide what is an “adequate” stockpile of 
			protective gear, and which community and other “partners” need to be 
			involved.
 
 That reflects the common view that states and localities should lead 
			health emergencies as a matter of right and responsibility, said Dr. 
			Michael Osterholm of the University of Minnesota, an expert on 
			infectious disease.
 
			
			 
			There is no detailed national plan or protocol for Ebola, he said, 
			and "some states are much, much better prepared from a public health 
			perspective to handle (an outbreak) than others."
 The closest things to nationwide plans are those developed for 
			pandemic flu and for so-called "all-hazards emergencies," said 
			Herrmann.
 
 Still, it would be difficult if not impossible for those preparing 
			for a health emergency to learn separate protocols for every 
			individual contingency.
 
			
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			The generic plans cover obvious needs such as calling in additional 
			staff to handle a flood of patients. There are also less obvious 
			needs: if schools are closed, hospitals will need to provide daycare 
			for their workers’ children, said Jeff Levi, executive director of 
			the private non-profit Trust for America's Health, a research and 
			advocacy group. 
			HOSPITAL DRILLS 
 Even top hospitals are learning that a plan for dealing with 
			infectious disease outbreaks may still leave them exposed to Ebola.
 
 Vanderbilt University Medical Center recently ran an Ebola drill 
			with a pretend patient arriving at the emergency room, being 
			admitted and placed in an isolation unit.
 
 During the drill, when doctors and nurses removed gowns, masks and 
			other protective equipment "they wanted to get out of that stuff and 
			do it quickly," Dr. William Schaffner, chairman of the Department of 
			Preventive Medicine, told an audience at the Woodrow Wilson 
			International Center for Scholars on Tuesday.
 
 Moving quickly raised the risk of accidentally touching fluids on 
			clothes, a likely reason for infection of healthcare workers in West 
			Africa and possibly Spain, Schaffner said. All staffers have since 
			been instructed to remove protective gear with a partner, "to count 
			to 10" during each step "and do it slowly."
 
			According to National Nurses United, 76 percent of nurses surveyed 
			say their hospital has not communicated to them any policy regarding 
			potential admission of Ebola patients, 85 percent say their hospital 
			has not provided education sessions where nurses can ask questions, 
			and just over one-third say their hospital has insufficient supplies 
			of face shields and impermeable gowns.
 Dr. Leon Yeh, director of emergency medicine at Saint Francis 
			Medical Center in Peoria, Illinois, said, "It's happened so fast we 
			haven't drilled specifically on Ebola."
 
 
			
			 
			That patchiness characterizes other elements of Ebola preparedness: 
			New York City 911 dispatchers have been asking callers with Ebola 
			symptoms about their travel history for about a week, but in Ohio's 
			Cuyahoga County, which includes Cleveland, they have not.
 
			Some blame lack of funds.
 The CDC’s budget for Public Health Emergency Preparedness fell from 
			$1.1 billion in 2006 to $698 million in 2010 to $585 million last 
			year. From 2008 to 2013, local health departments lost 48,300 jobs 
			to layoffs and attrition, or about 15 percent. "Those job losses 
			absolutely eroded the capabilities that would be needed if we had to 
			deal with Ebola," said Herrmann.
 
 In New York City, several hospitals have run drills with actors 
			portraying Ebola patients. Nurses, doctors and lobby security guards 
			- who might be the first people a patient encounters – are put to 
			the test.
 
 "It's the nitty-gritty details that we're now trying to work out," 
			Varma said, including how to dispose of waste generated by an Ebola 
			patient and who would provide food for people under quarantine.
 
 (Additional reporting by Julie Steenhuysen, editing by Michele 
			Gershberg, Peter Henderson and Frances Kerry)
 
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