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 Launched in 2007 under ousted boss Martin Winterkorn, the slogan has
had the advantage of simplicity, merely meaning "The Car". However,
the German carmaker's leaders, anxious to proclaim a reformed
corporate culture, have criticized it as out of step with a company
trying to show new-found humility.
A Volkswagen spokesman would not pronounce "Das Auto" dead quite
yet, but said it would no longer accompany the famous VW badge in
the coming advertising campaign.
Its replacement is hardly radical.
"Wherever our logo appears in future, it will be backed by the new
brand slogan 'Volkswagen'," the spokesman said. "The slogan will be
rolled out in stages across the world."
VW has been largely on the defensive since U.S. authorities revealed
in September it had admitted rigging exhaust emission tests on some
diesel-powered models. For weeks, it volunteered little information
about the extent of the cheating, instead reacting guardedly to a
flood of revelations and allegations.
The new campaign, discussed last week at a closed-door meeting of
2,000 group managers, is VW's latest attempt to regain the
initiative in rebuilding its reputation following a sharp drop in
sales in some markets, including the United States and Britain.
While the group produces everything from Bugatti supercars and
Ducati motorbikes to heavy-duty Scania trucks, the meeting in the
eastern German city of Dresden focused on the main VW brand.
According to a manager who was there, Volkswagen brand chief Herbert
Diess described the Winterkorn-era slogan - which could suggest that
VW alone can define the modern motor car - as absolutist.
Such an image of regal arrogance ill fits the reality of VW today: a
company facing huge costs from recalling and modifying cars to meet
emissions regulations, plus likely regulatory fines and a welter of
lawsuits.
Volkswagen needed to show humility, the manager said, and the slogan
'Das Auto' was pretentious. The old slogan also failed to convey
VW's technological ambitions in areas such as electrically-powered
vehicles, the manager said, requesting anonymity.
VW said the Dresden meeting discussed the task of leading the
company through the crisis and its future strategy.
Diess is a relative newcomer to VW, arriving from Bavarian rival BMW
only in July. Since Winterkorn's forced resignation on Sept. 23, the
group has reshuffled its management through internal promotions and
external hires.
New chief executive Matthias Mueller formerly ran the group's
Porsche sportscar unit, while the compliance chief was hired from
rival Daimler.
VW tried to engender a new atmosphere at the annual pre-Christmas
conference in Dresden last Thursday. For instance, male staff were
encouraged to remove their ties - an unheard of suggestion in the
buttoned-up Winterkorn era - and managers even folded shirts in a
team-building exercise.
All this, along with VW's first news conference on the scandal
earlier this month, suggests it is finally becoming a little less
defensive and trying to shape events from a public relations
perspective rather than merely reacting to them.
BAD START
Group communications chief Hans-Gerd Bode acknowledges frustrations
have built up while VW tries to establish who did what and when to
deceive the U.S. authorities, but he denies deliberate dishonesty in
VW's communications.
"I can assure you that we certainly did not, at any point, knowingly
lie to you," he told a group of reporters. "We have always tried to
give you the information which corresponded to the latest level of
our own knowledge at the time."
VW's PR response in the first three months of the crisis drew
criticism from regulators, customers and politicians. There have
been several missteps.
On Sept. 22, the company dismissed as "nonsense" a German media
report that Winterkorn would be replaced by Mueller. The following
day, Winterkorn resigned and Mueller was installed as his successor
on Sept. 25.
In November, its luxury Audi division denied that its three-liter
models had been fitted with illegal software, only to admit three
weeks later that in fact they had.
Three weeks into what has become known as 'Dieselgate' VW
communications staff began insisting media questions be submitted by
email for consideration by teams that included lawyers as well as
compliance staff. Often answers came back hours later or even the
following day.
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More recently the flow of information has improved, with Mueller and
Chairman Hans Dieter Poetsch updating reporters for two hours on
Dec. 10 on the state of VW's internal investigations.
But it had taken VW almost three months to hold its first
free-flowing news conference. Prior to that, Mueller had largely
stuck to reading out carefully worded statements, departing without
fielding questions.
PLAYING AN ADVANTAGE
One advantage of the long delay was that VW won time to come up with
a forward-looking plan that it could present at the news conference,
rather than having to dwell on its past misconduct.
"The earlier you communicate, the more backward-looking you have to
be," said Katja Nagel, chief executive of Munich-based crisis
communications consultancy Cetacea.
"To be able to look forward and talk about prevention of such cases
in the future - this is a strong position to be in. To do so, you
need time to substantiate your plans before publicly talking about
them."
Sometimes haste can be counterproductive, such as when Winterkorn
was forced out within a week of the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) revealing VW's admission. This left Mueller to pick up
the pieces immediately, rather than having Winterkorn stay for a
while to handle the fallout.
"They jumped on it a bit quickly by pushing Winterkorn out of the
door, so the scope for him to take the flak was limited," said
Robert Haigh, communications director at Brand Finance, a
London-based brand valuation consultancy.
In PR terms, VW was on the backfoot from the outset, allowing the
EPA to reveal its cheating, putting others in charge of the message.
Only occasionally did it show initiative. On Nov. 3 - six weeks
after the first revelations - VW volunteered it had discovered
carbon dioxide emissions and fuel usage of up to 800,000 cars sold
in Europe had been overstated.
It was later able to say that only a much smaller number of cars was
affected and the cost could be relatively minor, in contrast to the
figure of at least 2 billion euros ($2.20 billion) it had first
estimated.
VW said the initial estimate of 800,000 cars was a worst case
scenario and it was able to reduce the number of affected vehicles
following measurement checks.
This was a success under the rules of public relations; by initially
estimating the costs of a setback at a high level, a company can
subsequently present a lower number as good news.
But PR industry experts gave VW low marks for announcing that only a
small group of employees had been responsible for the cheating
without naming them - suggesting it did not yet know who they were.
VW has called in German PR firm Hering Schuppener, as well as
Finsbury in Britain and Edelman and Kekst in the United States. But
Bode made clear VW was still making the final decisions on crisis
communications.
"What we also need is a view from outside. They are excellent
sparring partners for us," he said.
(Additional reporting by Georgina Prodhan; Writing by David Stamp;
editing by Janet McBride)
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