To see how, and why, this is true look no farther than
chocolate-to-bottled-water giant Nestle’s euro bond expiring in
October of 2016 and its negative yield.
That’s right: it is possible to pay for the privilege of funding
Nestle’s ongoing operations, this despite the fact that it is
definitely not a charity.
Of course, you will, in all probability, get your money back, Nestle
being giant, strong and rated Aa2. And given that prices in the euro
zone are down 0.6 percent on the year to January, there is every
chance that the money you get back from Nestle will buy more
chocolate than when you and the euros were parted.
And Nestle does offer a yield pickup, excuse the joke, on a huge
chunk of the euro zone sovereign bond universe. Finland sold
five-year paper the other day for a negative yield, German yields
are negative six years out, while those in Austria, Sweden and the
Netherlands cost you money to hold for five years. France, always a
bit more of a risk, is priced with negative yields for maturities up
to three years.
Note please that while Nestle has the Rumpelstiltskin-like ability
to make money selling water, those euro zone governments can levy
taxes and all have calls on a central bank with a printing press.
That, the story goes, is the point. The European Central Bank in
launching quantitative easing is creating the conditions which turn
the reach for yield into this kind of defenestration. Yields have
compressed along the risk spectrum and when you get to the safer end
of the corporate bond rainbow there is simply no reward, in yield
terms, to be found.
So while Nestle investors like getting their money back as much as
the next guy, the phenomenon is probably telling us a bit more than
simply a macro call on euro zone deflation and ECB bond buying.
One interesting historical parallel is the absolutely fantastic
performance of U.S. corporate bonds during the 1930-1933 deflation.
During those years U.S. corporate bonds returned 6.7 percent on an
annualized basis, even before you take into account a cumulative
deflation approaching 25 percent.
Investors did suffer quite a few defaults during the period and
yields were lower than they otherwise might have been given that
public markets were principally open for higher-grade issuers.
A TALE OF TWO DEFLATIONS
A comparison of now and then, however, should give investors reason
for pause. Corporate bonds rated Baa yielded just under 6 percent in
December 1929 and Aaa issues were at 4.67 percent. And those returns
were earned despite a spike in yields up to 1932, one that took Baa
yields above 10 percent briefly. Pretty juicy given deflation. Thus
the rub: euro zone corporate bonds now yield very little, only a bit
above 1 percent for Baa-grade and a good deal less, and sinking, for
the better-quality stuff.
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All of this implies that we are going to need quite a bout of
deflation to drive returns in coming years, considering the starting
point.
Now you could argue that the very small corporate bond market in the
U.S. in the 1930s was terribly inefficient, and that part of the
reason the country had such a tough time was that firms found it so
hard to obtain financing. That led to good returns for those willing
to hold corporate bonds then, but the corollary should be less good
returns, but possibly better economic ones, now.
One of the big differences is that markets now have such touching
and complete faith in the determination, and ability, of central
banks and governments to keep markets open and funding easy. The
experience of 2008 was that when markets did freeze, the authorities
did 'whatever it takes' and firms were not exposed to the expected
refinancing risk.
That's as may be, but it is amazing to consider that the yields are
being offered on bonds in a currency which may not have a stable
line-up over the next two or three years, much less a stable
international value. You hate to think what the corporate bond
returns might look like for dollar-based investors.
The other irony here is that while liquidity is felt with fire-hose
strength among those firms large enough to access public markets,
the quite large rump of euro zone business which depends on bank
lending is less well watered, by far.
Holding corporate bonds may result in considerably worse returns in
this particular deflation.
(At the time of publication James Saft did not own any direct
investments in securities mentioned in this article. He may be an
owner indirectly as an investor in a fund. You can email him at
jamessaft@jamessaft.com and find more columns at http://blogs.reuters.com/james-saft)
(Editing by James Dalgleish)
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