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 Asked by reporters what would happen if the plan to purchase 60
billion euros of assets a month for 19 months failed, Draghi
answered: "We have Plan A. Period."
In fact, the money printing scheme known as quantitative easing is
already a plan "BBB" in the words of former European Economic and
Monetary Affairs Commissioner Olli Rehn, who termed it a "Belated
Big Bazooka."
For more than a year now, economists and central bankers have
pressed for dramatic action to halt tumbling inflation, sagging
price expectations and a stagnating economy.
But fierce resistance from German politicians and the influential
Bundesbank meant Draghi could not move until he had slowly and
painstakingly built overwhelming support in the ECB's policy-making
governing council for his monetary gamble.
This report shows how the ECB went from being deeply divided over QE
to launching a bolder and more open-ended version than most
investors had expected.
It is based on interviews with half a dozen persons involved in the
decision. All spoke on condition of anonymity because of the
confidentiality of ECB deliberations. Other policymakers have chosen
to speak publicly in the aftermath.
SALAMI SLICES
The Italian ECB chief's first tactic was to chop the decision into
separate questions, a strategy he thought most likely to construct
as broad a consensus as possible for QE.
He first sought agreement on the principle that buying sovereign
bonds of all euro zone member states in the secondary market in
proportion to their share in the central bank's capital was a
legitimate tool of monetary policy.
This not only built a vital foundation, but also neutralized
official German opposition.
"For me, the most important thing was we all agreed it was legal -
including the Germans on the council," one participant said.
Having secured unanimous support for the principle, debate could
then move to the timing and modalities of bond-buying, notably how
much risk was shared among national central banks.
Here, crucially, Draghi offered a compromise -- one that some
central bankers and analysts have said could weaken not just the
impact of QE but also the bank's credibility.
He suggested that only liability for jointly issued EU and European
Investment Bank bonds be mutualised, and that the default risk on
the other 80 percent of government debt to be bought should fall on
national central banks.
"Draghi argued that while many of us want to see a European fiscal
and political union with mutualised debt issuance, this requires a
political decision, and unelected central bankers should not do this
through the back door," one participant said.
This most disputed aspect of the decision -- to ring-fence most of
the risk -- was a concession to German Chancellor Angela Merkel and
the Bundesbank "designed to allay German hysteria", said another
source. The source added that it was of little practical relevance
since risks would inevitably be shared among Euro system central
banks if a euro zone country defaulted.
Draghi briefed Merkel on his intentions at a private meeting in
Berlin on Jan. 14. Despite her stated concerns about the "sweet
poison" of easy money causing speculative bubbles and loosening
pressure on governments to carry out painful reforms, Merkel
indicated she would respect the bank's independence, a source
briefed on the conversation said.
"The purpose was to let her know what was in the pipeline so she
would not negatively surprised," the source said.
"SHOCK AND AWE"
Once debt mutualisation was taken off the table, the governors were
able to agree on a bigger and more front-loaded bond-buying drive
than was initially proposed.
After initially exploring a 500 billion euros program, the formal
proposal circulated to governors on Jan 21 was for 50 billion euros
in monthly purchases over 22 months or a final bill of 1.1 trillion
euros.
In the meeting, they raised the amount to 60 billion euros a month
for at least 19 months -- a total of 1.14 billion.
"The main change was more front-loading to try to achieve a sense of
'shock and awe' in the markets," another person involved in the
decision said. "And the program is semi-open-ended. We subtly kept
the door open for more if needed."
The euro, which had fallen from a high of near $1.40 last May to
around $1.15 just before the decision, slipped below $1.12
afterwards in a move that will make European exports more
competitive and may eventually help revive inflation.
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In building his case, Draghi was supported by a welter of evidence
that downward pressure on prices and on inflation expectations was
accelerating.
The plunge in oil prices, while potentially a boon for purchasing
power in the euro area, risked depressing wage growth and
accelerating a price-cutting war, while making it harder for
households and governments to work off their debt. Market indicators
closely watched at the ECB's Frankfurt headquarters suggested
inflation might not recover before 2020.
And just a week before the ECB's final decision, Draghi was greatly
helped by an opinion issued by the legal adviser to the European
Union's highest court giving him a virtual green light.
Advocate-general Pedro Cruz Villalon rebuffed a German legal
challenge to a previous, as yet unused, bond-buying scheme. He found
overwhelmingly in the ECB's favor.
That was a much-need counter to a drumbeat of hostile comment from
German politicians, economists and media, accusing the ECB of
robbing German savers with negative real interest rates and
transferring credit risk from profligate southern states to German
taxpayers.
"That opinion made things much easier. It was very helpful in the
process. It made it much harder for the Germans to argue against
QE," an ECB policymaker said.
CLEARING THE AIR
Draghi also got his way in part because he had reassured council
members that he could work collaboratively with them.
Last October, seven members of the 24-strong council voted against
the policy of expanding the bank's balance sheet without resorting
to full QE, and a couple more voiced reservations about the ECB
chief's perceived secretive leadership style.
That led to a clearing of the air in which Draghi promised closer
consultation and more debate with governors outside his Frankfurt
inner circle.
"We decided to show our unity, and Mario has been more forthcoming
since then," a person familiar with the discussion said. "Since
November, the meetings have been better directed and there has been
more transparency."
No formal vote was taken on the QE decision. Instead, Draghi summed
up after each question, gaining agreement to announce the council's
unanimous support for the legitimacy of QE within the bank's
mandate.
An ECB official said the fact that executive board member Yves
Mersch from Luxembourg, a monetary hawk close to Germany, changed
his mind and ultimately backed the decision was helpful.
Yet several governors, including some who voted for the policy,
harbor doubts about whether it will work.
"We were trapped, both by market expectations and by the fact that
we couldn't leave this tool in our toolbox unused as we slid closer
to deflation," said one person involved in the decision.
Five members -- the German, Dutch, Austrian and Estonian national
central bank governors and the German member of the ECB's executive
board -- opposed the timing.
"I personally would have suggested thinking about this program but
waiting a bit (to see) if we really need it," Austrian ECB council
member Ewald Nowotny said on Austrian television, while Dutchman
Klaas Knot said in another television interview he was concerned the
ECB was using "such a powerful drug with considerable side-effects."
By upholding the ECB's independence and refraining from public
criticism, Merkel has blunted German dissent against the decision,
which will be reviewed in September 2016.
Asked what would happen if the goal had not been achieved by then,
ECB executive board member Benoit Coeure said at the World Economic
Forum in Davos: "If we haven't achieved what we want to achieve ...
then we'll have to do it for longer."
(Writing by Paul Taylor; Editing by Mike Peacock and Sophie Walker)
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