The rocket was based on engines taken from its massive stockpile
of mid-range missiles based on Soviet-era technology and electrical
parts too rudimentary to be targeted by a global missile control
regime, the experts said.
South Korea and the United States say Sunday's launch was a
long-range missile test that violated U.N. Security Council
resolutions barring the North from using ballistic missile
technology. It followed North Korea's Jan. 6 test of a nuclear
device, also in breach of Security Council resolutions.
The three-stage launch vehicle, named Kwangmyongsong, separated its
boosters successfully and put an object, which the North says is an
earth observation satellite, into orbit, South Korea said on
Tuesday.
A signal from the satellite had yet to be detected, Seoul said. No
signal was detected from the object North Korea launched into space
in 2012.
"I suspect the aim of the launch was to repeat the success, which
itself provides considerable engineering knowledge," said Michael
Elleman, a missile expert at the International Institute for
Strategic Studies.
South Korea's navy recovered parts of the first-stage booster but
failed to retrieve a significant section as it did in 2012 because
the stage self-destructed after lift-off, the South's military said.
South Korea said the launch resembled the one in 2012: The shape of
the rockets was similar, as were the locations where the first and
second stages splashed into the sea.
The 200-kg (441-lb) object launched on Sunday was about double the
size of that launched in 2012, a difference South Korean officials
said was not significant.
 CIRCUMVENTING SANCTIONS
The U.N. Security Council has imposed sanctions against the North
for its nuclear tests and long-range rocket launches dating to 2006,
banning arms trade and money flow that can fund its arms program.
But the North has managed to circumvent those measures in pursuing a
rocket program, widely suspected to be aimed at building an
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) that could threaten the
United States, and its fourth nuclear test last month.
"Sanctions raise the cost and impact reliability, but a determined
country can access the needed items if it is a priority
acquisition," Elleman said.
After the 2012 launch, South Korea retrieved a number of parts
associated with the first-stage booster, including one of the
steering engines, a nearly intact section of the fuel tank that
contained propellant, wiring and pressure sensors.
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Some of those components were imported, "ranging from cannibalized
Soviet Scud parts to equipment produced in the United States, Europe
and Asia," said Jeffrey Lewis, a nuclear expert at the Middlebury
Institute of International Studies.
"Most of the items are available commercially, off-the-shelf and are
not controlled. The underlying components are less important than
North Korea's ability to integrate them in a functioning rocket
program," he said.
If the Kwangmyongsong was powered by the same system as the Unha-3
launched in 2012, it used a cluster of Rodong missile engines with
thrust of about 27 tonnes each encased in an aluminium-magnesium
alloy body, welded unevenly by hand.
North Korea is believed to have more than 200 medium-range Rodong
missiles with a range of 1,300 km (807 miles), developed from Scud
missiles with Soviet technology.
South Korea's defense ministry said the rocket had a potential range
of 12,000 km (7,457 miles), Yonhap reported, similar to that of the
2012 rocket, and putting the U.S. mainland in reach.
While sanctions have not stopped the North's rocket development,
they likely limit what it can make or secure in large quantities of
material, equipment and fuel that are needed to quickly make
advances, experts said.
Some experts believe the North is a decade or more from using what
it learns from its space launch vehicles to building an ICBM capable
of threatening the U.S. west coast.
The North has also demonstrated no evidence of significant work in
building and testing a nuclear warhead rugged and stable enough to
withstand the stress of re-entry to atmosphere and detonate as
intended when it reaches its target.
Most experts believe it has also yet to show, after four nuclear
tests over 10 years, all with relatively small yields, that it has
successfully weaponized a nuclear device, let alone miniaturized one
to fit on a missile.
German aerospace engineer Markus Schiller said that if the North
were to have made real progress, there was no reason not to
demonstrate an advanced rocket, rather than turning again to what
was probably "their old workhorse".
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"I assume that they are doing the best they can with the Unha,
showing a very slow but continuous progress toward a small satellite
launch capability," he said. "Turning this program into a real
weapon that is deployed in numbers and could hit cities at the push
of a button will take decades at that pace."
(Editing by Tony Munroe and Nick Macfie)
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