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 The Silicon Valley maker of networking gear said it would ship new
versions of security software in the first half of this year to
replace those that rely on numbers generated by Dual Elliptic Curve
technology.
The statement on a blog post came a day after the presentation at a
Stanford University conference of research by a team of
cryptographers who found that Juniper's code had been changed in
multiple ways during 2008 to enable eavesdropping on virtual private
network sessions by customers.
Last month, Sunnyvale-based Juniper said it had found and replaced
two unauthorized pieces of code that allowed "back door" access,
which the researchers said had appeared in 2012 and 2014.
The 2014 back door was straightforward, said researcher Hovav
Shacham of the University of California, San Diego, allowing anyone
with the right password to see everything.
 The 2012 code changed a mathematical constant in Juniper's Netscreen
products that should have allowed its author to eavesdrop, according
to Shacham and his fellow investigators.
Juniper's initial patch had gotten rid of that constant in Dual
Elliptic Curve and replaced it with the version it had been using
since 2008.
But the academics who studied the code said that while Juniper had
not disavowed the 2008 code, it had not explained how that constant
was picked or why it was using the widely faulted Dual Elliptic
Curve at all.
Still another curve constant, quietly provided by the NSA and
required for some federal certification, was exposed in documents
leaked by former NSA contractor Edward Snowden as a key to the back
door.
Until now, the most influential adopter of Dual Elliptic Curve was
believed to be RSA, part of storage company EMC, which Reuters
reported received a $10-million federal contract to distribute it in
a software kit for others.
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Though the academic team looking at Juniper has not named a suspect
in the 2008, 2012 or 2014 changes, 2008 was one year after veteran
cryptographers raised questions about Dual Elliptic Curve.
A very advanced adversary could have seen how to manipulate Dual EC
and in theory managed to insert code through a cooperative or
unsuspecting Juniper employee, but the company had not advertised
the fact that it was using the formula at all.
A more logical suspect, said expert Nicholas Weaver of the
International Computer Science Institute, was the NSA, which might
have been displaced later by other countries' agencies or top-level
hackers in 2012 and 2014.
The NSA did not immediately respond to an emailed request for
comment.
Juniper said it was continuing to investigate.
http://forums.juniper.net/t5/Security-Incident-Response/Advancing-the-Security-of-Juniper-Products/ba-p/286383
It declined to answer questions from Reuters about the revisions.
(Reporting by Joseph Menn; Editing by Clarence Fernandez)
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