| 
		 
		Tesla’s big Model 3 bet rides on risky 
		assembly line strategy 
		
		 
		Send a link to a friend  
 
		
		
		 [April 24, 2017] 
		By Alexandria Sage 
		 
		(Reuters) - Tesla Inc <TSLA.O> Chief 
		Executive Elon Musk took many risks with the technology in his company's 
		cars on the way to surpassing Ford Motor Co's market value. Now Musk is 
		pushing boundaries in the factory that makes them. 
		 
		Most automakers test a new model's production line by building vehicles 
		with relatively cheap, prototype tools designed to be scrapped once they 
		deliver doors that fit, body panels with the right shape and dashboards 
		that don't have gaps or seams. 
		 
		Tesla, however, is skipping that preliminary step and ordering 
		permanent, more expensive equipment as it races to launch its Model 3 
		sedan by a self-imposed volume production deadline of September, Musk 
		told investors last month. 
		 
		Musk’s decision underscores his high-risk tolerance and willingness to 
		forego long-held industry norms that has helped Tesla upend the 
		traditional auto industry. While Tesla is not the first automaker to try 
		to accelerate production on the factory floor, no other rival is putting 
		this much faith in the production strategy succeeding. 
		 
		Musk expects the Model 3 rollout to help Tesla deliver five times its 
		current annual sales volume, a key target in the automaker's efforts to 
		stop burning cash. 
		 
		"He's pushing the envelope to see how much time and cost he can take out 
		of the process," said Ron Harbour, a manufacturing consultant at Oliver 
		Wyman. 
		 
		Investors are already counting on Tesla’s factory floor success, with 
		shares soaring 39 percent since January as it makes the leap from niche 
		producer to mass producer in far less time than rivals. 
		
		
		  
		
		There are caution signs, however. The production equipment designed to 
		produce millions of cars is expensive to fix or replace if it doesn't 
		work, industry experts say. Tesla has encountered quality problems on 
		its existing low-volume cars, and the Model 3 is designed to sell in 
		numbers as high as 500,000 vehicles a year, raising the potential cost 
		of recalls or warranty repairs. 
		 
		"It's an experiment, certainly," said Consumer Reports' Jake Fisher, who 
		has done extensive testing of Tesla's previous Models S and X. Tesla 
		could possibly fix errors quicker, speeding up the process, "or it could 
		be they have unsuspected problems they'll have a hard time dealing 
		with." 
		 
		Musk discussed the decision to skip what he referred to as "beta" 
		production testing during a call last month with an invited group of 
		investors. Details were published on Reddit by an investor on the call. 
		. 
		 
		He also said that “advanced analytical techniques” – code word for 
		computer simulations - would help Tesla in advancing straight to 
		production tooling. 
		 
		Tesla declined to confirm details of the call or comment on its 
		production strategy. 
		 
		The auto industry's incumbents have not been standing still. Volkswagen 
		AG's Audi division launched production of a new plant in Mexico using 
		computer simulations of production tools – and indeed the entire 
		assembly line and factory - that Audi said it believed to be an industry 
		first. That process allowed the plant to launch production 30 percent 
		faster than usual, Audi said. 
		 
		An Audi executive involved in the Mexican plant launch, Peter 
		Hochholdinger, is now Tesla's vice president of production. 
		
		MAKING TOOLS FASTER 
		 
		Typically, automakers test their design with limited production using 
		lower grade equipment that can be modified slightly to address problems. 
		When most of the kinks are worked out, they order the final equipment. 
		 
		
            [to top of second column]  | 
            
             
            
			  
            
			Tesla vehicles are being assembled by robots at Tesla Motors Inc 
			factory in Fremont, California, U.S. on July 25, 2016. 
			REUTERS/Joseph White/File Photo  
            
              
			Tesla’s decision to move directly to the final tools is in part 
			because lower grade, disposable equipment known as “soft tooling” 
			ended up complicating the debut of the problem-plagued Model X SUV 
			in 2015, according to a person familiar with the decision and 
			Tesla’s assembly line planning. 
			 
			Working on a tight deadline, Tesla had no time to incorporate 
			lessons learned from soft tooling before having to order the 
			permanent production tooling, making the former's value negligible, 
			the source said. 
			 
			"Soft tooling did very little for the program and arguably hurt 
			things," said the person. 
			 
			In addition, Tesla has learned to better modify final production 
			tools, and its 2015 purchase of a Michigan tooling company means it 
			can make major equipment 30 percent faster than before, and more 
			cheaply as well, the source said. 
			 
			Financial pressure is partly driving Tesla’s haste. The quicker 
			Tesla can deliver the Model 3 with its estimated $35,000 base price 
			to the 373,000 customers who have put down a $1000 deposit, the 
			closer it can log $13 billion. 
			 
			Tesla has labored under financial pressure since it was founded in 
			2003. The company has yet to turn an annual profit, and earlier this 
			year Musk said the company was "close to the edge" as it look toward 
			capital spending of $2-2.5 billion in the first half of 2017. 
			 
			Tesla has since gotten more breathing room by raising $1.2 billion 
			in fresh capital in March and selling a five per cent stake to 
			Chinese internet company Tencent Holdings Ltd <0700.HK> . 
			
			
			  
			
			 
			 
			Musk has spoken to investors about his vision of an "alien 
			dreadnought" factory that uses artificial intelligence and robots to 
			build cars at speeds faster than human assembly workers could 
			manage. 
			 
			But there are limits to what technology can do in the heavily 
			regulated car business. For example, Tesla will still have to use 
			real cars in crash tests required by the U.S. government, because 
			federal rules do not allow simulated crash results to substitute for 
			data from a real car. 
			 
			(Editing by Peter Henderson and Edward Tobin) 
			
			[© 2017 Thomson Reuters. All rights 
			reserved.] 
			Copyright 2017 Reuters. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, 
			broadcast, rewritten or redistributed.  |