Special Report: How Monsanto's GM cotton
sowed trouble in Africa
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[December 08, 2017]
By Joe Bavier
BOBO-DIOULASSO, Burkina Faso (Reuters) - In
2000, farmers in Burkina Faso, Africa's top cotton grower, were
desperate. Their cotton fetched top prices because its high-quality
fiber lent a luxurious sheen to clothing and bedsheets. But pests –
bollworms – were threatening the crop.
Even when you dropped the bollworm larvae into a bucket of poison,
farmers said, they kept swimming.
U.S. seeds and pesticide company Monsanto proposed an answer: a
genetically modified strain of cotton called Bollgard II, which it had
already introduced in America and was marketing worldwide. GM was
established in large-scale farming in South Africa, but not among the
smallholders who produce most African cotton. The Burkina farmers agreed
to a trial and the country introduced seeds with the gene in 2008.
The resulting cotton was pest-free, and the harvest more abundant. By
2015, three-quarters of all Burkina Faso's production was GM, and it
became a showcase for the technology among smallholders in Africa. From
2007 to 2015, delegations from at least 17 different African nations
visited Burkina to see it.

But there was a problem. While the bug-resistant genes produced more
volume, the quality fell. Last season, the cotton farmers of Burkina
Faso abandoned the GM varieties.
"Genetically modified cotton, it's not good today. It's not good
tomorrow," said farmer Paul Badoun, picking apart a lumpy handful of raw
cotton in his field near Kongolekan, a village of small mud brick houses
in the southwestern cotton heartland.
The country's GM experience, told by more than three dozen Monsanto
insiders, farmers, scientists and cotton company officials as well as in
confidential documents reviewed by Reuters, highlights a little-known
quandary faced by genetic engineering. For Burkina Faso's cotton
growers, GM ended up as a trade-off between quantity and quality. For
Monsanto, whose $13.5 billion in revenues in 2016 were more than Burkina
Faso's GDP, it proved uneconomical to tailor the product closely to a
market niche.
The Burkinabes knew from the start that American cotton varieties
containing Monsanto's gene could not deliver the quality of their
home-grown crop, cotton company officials and researchers told Reuters.
But they pressed on because Monsanto agreed to breed its pest-resistant
genes into their native plants, which they hoped would protect the
cotton and keep its premium value. That, they say, was a failure.
In July 2015 Monsanto wrote to the Burkina growers saying the quality
problems had been offset by other benefits. Asked by Reuters about the
quality problems and whether it promised to fix them, the company did
not respond. Instead, it pointed to a dispute that erupted with Burkina
Faso over payments for seed-licensing fees.
"We exited our cotton business in Burkina Faso due to the increasing
challenge in collecting license fees that had remained due for a
significant period, despite Monsanto's efforts to explore pragmatic
solutions," the company said in an emailed response to Reuters' queries.
The company, which has agreed to a $66 billion takeover by Germany's
Bayer, told Reuters its genetic traits transformed Burkina Faso's cotton
sector, improving the lives of 350,000 farmers and the roughly 4 million
Burkinabes who depend on them, by increasing production and reducing
pesticide use.

Roger Zangre, a Burkinabe agricultural scientist who helped bring
Monsanto to Burkina Faso, said Burkina's technical shortcomings were
partly to blame for the problems with the GM crops. "Before the
introduction, our capacities should have been reinforced. But all of
that fell by the wayside, and that's on us ... We can't blame Monsanto
alone," said Zangre, who was employed by the state and said he had never
been paid by Monsanto.
But Brian Dowd-Uribe, an assistant professor at the University of San
Francisco who has studied the case, said the Burkinabe experience has
undermined confidence in Monsanto. He and five other international and
Burkinabe researchers and cotton sector officials believe Burkina's
quality problem boiled down to poor breeding processes.
"Here is an issue that was established early on in the breeding process
and trial stage that over almost 10 years they were unable to resolve,"
he said. "What does that mean in terms of Monsanto's ability to
successfully steward breeding programs that allow for the ...
characteristics desired by their partners?"
Monsanto declined to comment on this. It said its Bollgard II technology
remains under consideration in several countries in sub-Saharan Africa
and is showing good results in trials in Malawi. Authorities in Malawi
did not respond to requests for comment.
Africa's annual cotton exports are worth nearly $1.2 billion, according
to statistics compiled by the Swiss-based International Trade Centre.
South Africa and Sudan are the only other African nations apart from
Burkina Faso to introduce GM cotton so far. Sudan opted to introduce
foreign varieties that it knew would produce lower quality cotton,
calculating that the increased output would offset the drop in value, a
cotton expert at Sudan's agriculture ministry said. For now, he added,
that bet has paid off.
In Ghana, Uganda and Nigeria, growers have also been testing Bollgard
II, but they say Burkina Faso's experience has made them more cautious.
"We are being very skeptical now," said James Wiyor, executive secretary
of Ghana's Cotton Development Authority.
Mali, Africa's number two producer and Burkina Faso's main local rival,
says it stuck with conventional, high-quality strains; it says this
decision gave it an edge over its GM rivals.

"It's a shame," said Jane Dever, a professor and cotton breeder at Texas
A&M University, discussing Burkina Faso's experience, "because (Burkina
Faso) really was (Monsanto's) guinea pig for introducing transgenic
cotton into West Africa."
"EVERYTHING WAS GOOD"
Burkina Faso is big in African cotton, but small in global terms. India,
the world leader, grows over 20 times more cotton each year. Even so,
Burkina depends heavily on cotton exports.
Around a fifth of its workforce participates in the sector, according to
the World Bank. Unable to go head-to-head against big producers, Burkina
Faso instead cultivated quality.
"Burkina cotton was one of the most preferred cottons," said Ashwin
Subramanian, head of Singapore-based commodities trader Olam
International's West African cotton business. "The importing countries
in the Far East always preferred Burkina cotton. The quality was good.
The consistency was good. Everything was good."
The country's major pest problems began in the 1990s - first whiteflies,
then bollworms which feed on flower buds, withering them and damaging
fruits.
Farmers were spending around $60 million every year to protect their
cotton, and even then losing 20 percent to 65 percent of their crops,
Monsanto told Reuters. Losses could rise to 90 percent in fields that
had not been treated with pesticides.
In 1995, the Burkina government asked Zangre, the local agricultural
scientist, to look into biotech solutions. He met Monsanto officials at
a conference in Cameroon in 1999 and the following year helped introduce
the company's representatives to officials from Burkina's cotton
companies and the farmers' union. Together with government officials,
they decide policy for the cotton sector.
In 2003, Burkinabe researchers began testing Bollgard II cotton that was
being grown in the United States. Right away, they confirmed it was
effective against pests. It contains a bacterium called Bacillus
thuringiensis, or Bt, that wards off insect larvae.

But the quality problems were equally obvious.
Cotton quality is most commonly determined by the length of the fiber,
or staple, that emerges when a tuft is pulled out of a cotton boll. The
longer the fiber or staple, the higher the quality. Monsanto's American
Bt cotton produced short fibers, the kind typically used to make fabric
for everyday use such as jeans and t-shirts.
"When we started using it, we knew that the American variety wouldn't
interest us, because it didn't have the quality we required," said
Bazoumana Koulibaly, research head for the cotton program at Burkina
Faso's agricultural research institute, INERA.
The Burkinabes said they asked Monsanto to breed the Bt gene into their
native cotton, so they could marry its pest resistance with their long
fibers. However, tests conducted by INERA in 2006 and 2008 found that
the new Burkinabe Bt fibers were between 0.88 mm and 2.41 mm shorter
than the country's conventional cotton.
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Farmers work at a cotton market in Soungalodaga village near
Bobo-Dioulasso, Burkina Faso March 8, 2017. Picture taken March 8,
2017. REUTERS/Luc Gnago

In 2008, Burkina Faso's government tried to introduce new liability
provisions to the deal, according to a U.S. diplomatic cable
published by WikiLeaks. Then U.S. Ambassador Jeanine Jackson
intervened on behalf of Monsanto.
"Upon hearing the news of a possible halt to the planned
commercialisation of the Bt cotton in Burkina Faso, Ambassador
discussed the issues with both Prime Minister Tertius Zongo and
Monsanto reps," the cable said. "The PM then interceded and
instructed that the administrative order be changed to meet
Monsanto's terms."
The Burkinabes initially wanted to commit Monsanto to compensating
the cotton company and its associates if there were problems,
according to a memo the cotton industry sent to Monsanto which was
reviewed by Reuters. The revised administrative order said instead
disputes should be handled through legal and regulatory channels and
resolved in good faith.
Zongo declined to comment on why he interceded. Jackson, who has now
retired from diplomatic service, said she did not recall the details
but noted that advocacy of U.S. businesses and investments is
usually the "number one task" for ambassadors. Monsanto did not
respond to a request for comment on this point.
Burkina introduced the new GM cotton for seed production in the
2008-2009 season. A full-scale commercial launch was scheduled for
the following season.
Wilfried Yameogo, the director of Sofitex, Burkina Faso's biggest
cotton company, said the decision to go ahead was based on a pledge
from Monsanto that it would fix the quality problems ahead of the
commercial launch.
"Monsanto made promises, and we continued to produce it. They said,
'No, no, no. It will be okay.'" Yameogo said. Reuters could not
confirm whether such a promise was made and Monsanto did not respond
to a request for comment on this.
SHORT FIBERS
The growers moved fast. By 2014, GM cotton had surged to almost
three-quarters of all the cotton acreage planted in Burkina Faso.

In the three seasons before Burkina introduced Bt cotton, over 90
percent of its output was classed as high quality medium to long
staple by the country's cotton companies. In 2010-2011, GM cotton
made up over half of production, but only 21 percent of the crop
reached the previous quality standard.
"There was a problem selling this cotton," Agriculture Minister
Jacob Ouedraogo told Reuters.
Monsanto paid nearly $3 million in compensation to the Burkinabes in
those first two seasons due to the quality problems, according to
the memo reviewed by Reuters, which was sent in 2015 to complain
about losses cotton companies had incurred. Monsanto declined to
comment on this point.
Burkina Faso's cotton continued to suffer. In 2014-2015, average Bt
cotton fibers from around the country were up to 2.29 mm shorter
than the conventional strains. The cotton lost its premium pricing.
The impact, according to the Burkinabes, was a drop in the value of
its output of at least 3 cents per pound of cotton, or between 2 and
5 percent of the volatile global benchmark price.
Singapore trader Olam International had been among Burkina Faso's
biggest customers. It had to seek out new buyers, eventually selling
on the cheaper output to textile mills in Pakistan, said Olam's West
Africa cotton chief Subramanian.
KNOW-HOW
Geneticists like Dever say the problem was the process, not the Bt
gene. Retaining specific quality characteristics in new varieties is
one of the hardest tasks facing cotton breeders, Dever said.
"It can be done," she said. "You just have to make sure you do the
appropriate number of backcrosses and you do the appropriate amount
of testing."
To introduce a gene, breeders cross a plant already containing it
with a second parent possessing other desired traits - in this case,
Burkina's long cotton fibers. They then breed the first hybrid with
the second parent. The process, known as a backcross, continues: The
more backcrosses, the more the new variety will resemble the second
parent.
Zangre and INERA'S Koulibaly said Monsanto carried out just two
backcrosses before introducing the new variety. "Evidently the two
backcrosses were insufficient. It was necessary to go further.
Breeders will go to six or seven backcrosses to really get over 99
percent purity," Koulibaly said. Monsanto declined to comment on
this.

Dever, who has developed cotton varieties for companies including
Bayer, estimated that carrying out three more backcrosses would have
pushed back the release date of Bt cotton by at least a year.
Zangre said that if the Burkinabes had possessed the proper tools
and technical knowledge to introduce the Bt genes themselves, they
could have avoided the mistake.
Yves Carrière, an entomology professor at the University of Arizona
who studies Bt crops, arrived in Burkina Faso in 2009 planning to
set up a program to monitor the introduction. He was worried, he
said: The Burkina authorities had plans to head off potential
problems, but the universities and state agencies that in the
developed world would typically support such a biotechnology launch
appeared weak.
"It was rushed. That's for sure ... It was rushed and far from
optimal," he said. "It shows the shortcomings of even the largest
corporations, which do not have the structure and the means to do
everything that needs to be done in developing countries."
For its part, Monsanto never based technical staff in the country, a
former Monsanto employee who was involved in the process told
Reuters. Instead, he said Monsanto developed the new Bt varieties in
the United States, paid around $350,000 annually to fund research
institute INERA's work on the GM cotton, and flew in its own
scientists when required.
Monsanto declined to say if it had based its own researchers in
Burkina Faso, but said its activities resulted in significant
investments in research and development.

"ARMED AND SEASONED"
By 2016, the Inter-Professional Cotton Association of Burkina
(AICB), the cotton sector's umbrella organization, claimed the
cotton companies' losses had reached around $85 million over the
previous five seasons.
In the final settlement that ended the partnership last December,
Yameogo said Monsanto ceded over $19 million in royalties that the
Burkinabes had been withholding. In exchange, the Burkinabes agreed
to drop demands for compensation. Monsanto said the settlement,
which it called a "goodwill gesture," was confidential.
For Burkina Faso's farmers, Bt cotton's benefits were "barely
acceptable," according to a 2016 study by the French government's
agricultural research agency, CIRAD. It found farmers made more
money, but the new seeds also increased their financial risk.
Burkina Faso is now clawing back its reputation. In the 2016-2017
season, the first since it returned to conventional cotton seeds,
98.8 percent of its production was graded as medium to long staple.
So far, the bollworms have not returned.
If they do, Burkinabe officials say they aren't turning their backs
on GM, although the country does not use the technology at present.
However, they say, any varieties must fit their unique needs.
"We still favor the use of biotechnologies," said Yameogo, the
cotton company boss. "We've been armed and seasoned by the
experience we had with Monsanto."
(Reporting by Joe Bavier in Bobo-Dioulasso; Additional reporting by
Nadoun Coulibaly in Ouagadougou, Khalid Abdelaziz in Khartoum, Arwa
Gaballa in Cairo, Tiemoko Diallo in Bamako, Kwasi Kpodo in Accra,
Elias Biryabarema in Kampala, Mabvuto Banda in Lilongwe, and Alexis
Akwagyiram in Lagos; Edited by Sara Ledwith)
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