Exclusive: Chief U.S. spy catcher says
China using LinkedIn to recruit Americans
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[August 31, 2018]
By Warren Strobel and Jonathan Landay
WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The United States'
top spy catcher said Chinese espionage agencies are using fake LinkedIn
accounts to try to recruit Americans with access to government and
commercial secrets, and the company should shut them down.
William Evanina, the U.S. counter-intelligence chief, told Reuters in an
interview that intelligence and law enforcement officials have told
LinkedIn, owned by Microsoft Corp., about China’s "super aggressive"
efforts on the site.
He said the Chinese campaign includes contacting thousands of LinkedIn
members at a time, but he declined to say how many fake accounts U.S.
intelligence had discovered, how many Americans may have been contacted
and how much success China has had in the recruitment drive.
German and British authorities have previously warned their citizens
that Beijing is using LinkedIn to try to recruit them as spies. But this
is the first time a U.S. official has publicly discussed the challenge
in the United States and indicated it is a bigger problem than
previously known.
Evanina said LinkedIn should look at copying the response of Twitter,
Google and Facebook, which have all purged fake accounts allegedly
linked to Iranian and Russian intelligence agencies.
"I recently saw that Twitter is cancelling, I don’t know, millions of
fake accounts, and our request would be maybe LinkedIn could go ahead
and be part of that," said Evanina, who heads the U.S. National
Counter-Intelligence and Security Center.
It is highly unusual for a senior U.S. intelligence official to single
out an American-owned company by name and publicly recommend it take
action. LinkedIn boasts 562 million users in more than 200 counties and
territories, including 149 million U.S. members.
Evanina did not, however, say whether he was frustrated by LinkedIn's
response or whether he believes it has done enough.
LinkedIn's head of trust and safety, Paul Rockwell, confirmed the
company had been talking to U.S. law enforcement agencies about Chinese
espionage efforts. Earlier this month, LinkedIn said it had taken down
“less than 40” fake accounts whose users were attempting to contact
LinkedIn members associated with unidentified political organizations.
Rockwell did not say whether those were Chinese accounts.
“We are doing everything we can to identify and stop this activity,”
Rockwell told Reuters. "We’ve never waited for requests to act and
actively identify bad actors and remove bad accounts using information
we uncover and intelligence from a variety of sources including
government agencies."
Rockwell declined to provide numbers of fake accounts associated with
Chinese intelligence agencies. He said the company takes “very prompt
action to restrict accounts and mitigate and stop any essential damage
that can happen” but gave no details.
LinkedIn "is a victim here," Evanina said. "I think the cautionary tale
... is, 'You are going to be like Facebook. Do you want to be where
Facebook was this past spring with congressional testimony, right?'" he
said, referring to lawmakers' questioning of Facebook CEO Mark
Zuckerberg on Russia's use of Facebook to meddle in the 2016 U.S.
elections.
China's foreign ministry disputed Evanina's allegations.
"We do not know what evidence the relevant U.S. officials you cite have
to reach this conclusion. What they say is complete nonsense and has
ulterior motives," the ministry said in a statement.
EX-CIA OFFICER ENSNARED
Evanina said he was speaking out in part because of the case of Kevin
Mallory, a retired CIA officer convicted in June of conspiring to commit
espionage for China.
A fluent Mandarin speaker, Mallory was struggling financially when he
was contacted via a LinkedIn message in February 2017 by a Chinese
national posing as a headhunter, according to court records and trial
evidence.
The individual, using the name Richard Yang, arranged a telephone call
between Mallory and a man claiming to work at a Shanghai think tank.
During two subsequent trips to Shanghai, Mallory agreed to sell U.S.
defense secrets - sent over a special cellular device he was given -
even though he assessed his Chinese contacts to be intelligence
officers, according to the U.S. government’s case against him. He is due
to be sentenced in September and could face life in prison.
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Small toy figures are seen between displayed U.S. flag and Linkedin
logo in this illustration picture, August 30, 2018. To match
Exclusive LINKEDIN-CHINA/ESPIONAGE REUTERS/Dado Ruvic/Illustration
While Russia, Iran, North Korea and other nations also use LinkedIn
and other platforms to identify recruitment targets, the U.S.
intelligence officials said China is the most prolific and poses the
biggest threat.
U.S. officials said China’s Ministry of State Security has
“co-optees” - individuals who are not employed by intelligence
agencies but work with them - set up fake accounts to approach
potential recruits.
They said the targets include experts in fields such as
supercomputing, nuclear energy, nanotechnology, semi-conductors,
stealth technology, health care, hybrid grains, seeds and green
energy.
Chinese intelligence uses bribery or phony business propositions in
its recruitment efforts. Academics and scientists, for example, are
offered payment for scholarly or professional papers and, in some
cases, are later asked or pressured to pass on U.S. government or
commercial secrets.
Some of those who set up fake accounts have been linked to IP
addresses associated with Chinese intelligence agencies, while
others have been set up by bogus companies, including some that
purport to be in the executive recruiting business, said a senior
U.S. intelligence official, who requested anonymity in order to
discuss the matter.
The official said “some correlation” has been found between
Americans targeted through LinkedIn and data hacked from the Office
of Personnel Management, a U.S. government agency, in attacks in
2014 and 2015.
The hackers stole sensitive private information, such as addresses,
financial and medical records, employment history and fingerprints,
of more than 22 million Americans who had undergone background
checks for security clearances.
The United States identified China as the leading suspect in the
massive hacking, an assertion China’s foreign ministry at the time
dismissed as `absurd logic.`
UNPARALLELED SPYING EFFORT
About 70 percent of China’s overall espionage is aimed at the U.S.
private sector, rather than the government, said Joshua Skule, the
head of the FBI’s intelligence division, which is charged with
countering foreign espionage in the United States.
"They are conducting economic espionage at a rate that is
unparalleled in our history," he said.
Evanina said five current and former U.S. officials - including
Mallory - have been charged with or convicted of spying for China in
the past two and a half years.
He indicated that additional cases of suspected espionage for China
by U.S. citizens are being investigated, but declined to provide
details.
U.S. intelligence services are alerting current and former officials
to the threat and telling them what security measures they can take
to protect themselves.
Some current and former officials post significant details about
their government work history online - even sometimes naming
classified intelligence units that the government does not publicly
acknowledge.
LinkedIn "is a very good site," Evanina said. "But it makes for a
great venue for foreign adversaries to target not only individuals
in the government, formers, former CIA folks, but academics,
scientists, engineers, anything they want. It’s the ultimate
playground for collection."
(Reporting by Warren Strobel and Jonathan Landay; Additional
reporting by John Walcott; Editing by Kieran Murray and Ross Colvin)
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