Exclusive: Lebanon's leaders were warned in July about explosives at
port - documents
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[August 11, 2020]
By Samia Nakhoul and Laila Bassam
BEIRUT (Reuters) - Lebanese security
officials warned the prime minister and president last month that 2,750
tonnes of ammonium nitrate stored in Beirut's port posed a security risk
and could destroy the capital if it exploded, according to documents
seen by Reuters and senior security sources.
Just over two weeks later, the industrial chemicals went up in a massive
blast that obliterated most of the port and swathes of the capital,
killed at least 163 people, injured 6,000 and destroyed 6,000 buildings,
according to municipal authorities.
A report by the General Directorate of State Security on events leading
up to the explosion included a reference to a private letter sent to
President Michel Aoun and Prime Minister Hassan Diab on July 20.
While the content of the letter was not in the report seen by Reuters, a
senior security official said it summed up the findings of a judicial
investigation launched in January which concluded the chemicals needed
to be secured immediately.
The state security report, which confirmed the correspondence to the
president and the prime minister, has not previously been reported.
"There was a danger that this material, if stolen, could be used in a
terrorist attack," the official told Reuters.
"At the end of the investigation, Prosecutor General (Ghassan) Oweidat
prepared a final report which was sent to the authorities," he said,
referring to the letter sent to the prime minister and president by the
General Directorate of State Security, which oversees port security.
"I warned them that this could destroy Beirut if it exploded," said the
official, who was involved in writing the letter and declined to be
named.
Reuters could not independently confirm his description of the letter.
The presidency did not respond to requests for comment about the July 20
letter.
A representative for Diab, whose government resigned on Monday following
the blast, said the PM received the letter on July 20 and it was sent to
the Supreme Defence Council for advice within 48 hours. "The current
cabinet received the file 14 days prior to the explosion and acted on it
in a matter of days. Previous administrations had over six years and did
nothing."
The prosecutor general did not respond to requests for comment.
'DO WHAT IS NECESSARY'
The correspondence could fuel further criticism and public fury that the
explosion is just the latest, if not most dramatic, example of the
government negligence and corruption that have already pushed Lebanon to
economic collapse.
As protests over the blast raged in Lebanon on Monday, Diab's government
resigned, though it will remain as a caretaker administration until a
new cabinet is formed.
The rebuilding of Beirut alone is expected to cost up to $15 billion, in
a country already effectively bankrupt with total banking system losses
exceeding $100 billion.
Aoun confirmed last week that he had been informed about the material.
He told reporters he had directed the secretary general of the Supreme
Defence Council, an umbrella group of security and military agencies
chaired by the president, to "do what is necessary".
"(The state security service) said it is dangerous. I am not
responsible! I don't know where it was put and I didn't know how
dangerous it was. I have no authority to deal with the port directly.
There is a hierarchy and all those who knew should have known their
duties to do the necessary," Aoun said.
Many questions remain over why the shipment of ammonium nitrate docked
in Beirut in late 2013. Even more baffling is why such a huge stash of
dangerous material, used in bombs and fertilisers, was allowed to remain
there for so long.
The letter sent to Lebanon's president and prime minister followed a
string of memos and letters sent to the country's courts over the
previous six years by port, customs and security officials, repeatedly
urging judges to order the removal of the ammonium nitrate from its
position so close to the city centre.
The General Directorate of State Security's report seen by Reuters said
many requests had been submitted, without giving an exact number. It
said the port's manifest department sent several written requests to the
customs directorate up until 2016 asking them to call on a judge to
order the material be re-exported immediately.
"But until now, no decision has been issued over this matter. After
consulting one of our chemical specialists, the expert confirmed that
this material is dangerous and is used to produce explosives," the
General Directorate of State Security report said.
HAZARDOUS MATERIAL
The road to last week's tragedy began seven years ago, when the Rhosus,
a Russian-chartered, Moldovan-flagged vessel carrying ammonium nitrate
from Georgia to Mozambique, docked in Beirut to try to take on extra
cargo to cover the fees for passage through the Suez Canal, according to
the ship's captain.
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Debris are seen in the port area after a blast in Beirut, Lebanon,
August 10, 2020. REUTERS/Hannah McKay
Port authorities impounded the Rhosus in December 2013 by judicial
order 2013/1031 due to outstanding debts owed to two companies that
filed claims in Beirut courts, the state security report showed.
In May 2014, the ship was deemed unseaworthy and its cargo was
unloaded in October 2014 and warehoused in what was known as Hangar
12. The ship sank near the port's breakwater on Feb. 18, 2018, the
security report showed.
Moldova lists the owner of the ship as Panama-based Briarwood Corp.
Briarwood could not immediately be reached for comment.
In February 2015, Nadim Zwain, a judge from the Summary Affairs
Court, which deals with urgent issues, appointed an expert to
inspect the cargo, according to the security report.
The report said the expert concluded that the material was hazardous
and, through the port authorities, requested it be transferred to
the army. Reuters could not independently confirm the expert's
account.
Lebanese army command rejected the request and recommended the
chemicals be transferred or sold to the privately owned Lebanese
Explosives Company, the state security report said.
The report did not say why the army had refused to accept the cargo.
A security official told Reuters it was because they didn't need it.
The army declined to comment.
The explosives company's management told Reuters it had not been
interested in purchasing confiscated material and the firm had its
own suppliers and government import licences.
From then on, customs and security officials wrote to judges roughly
every six months asking for the removal of the material, according
to the requests seen by Reuters.
Judges and customs officials contacted by Reuters declined to
comment.
A number of customs and port officials have since been detained as
part of the investigation into the blast.
'BAD STORAGE AND BAD JUDGMENT'
In January 2020, a judge launched an official investigation after it
was discovered that Hangar 12 was unguarded, had a hole in its
southern wall and one of its doors dislodged, meaning the hazardous
material was at risk of being stolen.
In his final report following the investigation, Prosecutor General
Oweidat "gave orders immediately" to ensure hangar doors and holes
were repaired and security provided, a second high-ranking security
official who also requested anonymity said.
On June 4, based on those orders, state security instructed port
authorities to provide guards at Hangar 12, appoint a director for
the warehouse and secure all the doors and repair the hole in the
southern wall, according to the state security report and security
officials.
The port authorities did not immediately respond to requests for
comment.
"The maintenance started and (port authorities) sent a team of
Syrian workers (but) there was no one supervising them when they
entered to fix the holes," the security official said.
During the work, sparks from welding took hold and fire started to
spread, the official said.
"Given that there were fireworks stored in the same hangar, after an
hour a big fire was set off by the fireworks and that spread to the
material that exploded when the temperature exceeded 210 degrees,"
the high-ranking security official said.
The official blamed port authorities for not supervising the repair
crew and for storing fireworks alongside a vast deposit of high
explosives.
Reuters could not determine what happened to the workers repairing
the hangar.
"Only because the hangar faces the sea, the impact of the explosion
was reduced. Otherwise all of Beirut would have been destroyed," he
said. "The issue is all about negligence, irresponsibility, bad
storage and bad judgment."
(Additional reporting by Nadia El Gowely and Ghaida Ghantous;
Editing by David Clarke and Giles Elgood)
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