Exclusive: In tactical shift, Iran grows new, loyal elite from among
Iraqi militias
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[May 21, 2021]
By John Davison and Ahmed Rasheed
BAGHDAD (Reuters) - Iran has hand picked
hundreds of trusted fighters from among the cadres of its most powerful
militia allies in Iraq, forming smaller, elite and fiercely loyal
factions in a shift away from relying on large groups with which it once
exerted influence.
The new covert groups were trained last year in drone warfare,
surveillance and online propaganda and answer directly to officers in
Iran's Quds Force, the arm of its Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) that
controls its allied militia abroad.
They have been responsible for a series of increasingly sophisticated
attacks against the United States and its allies, according to accounts
by Iraqi security officials, militia commanders and Western diplomatic
and military sources.
The tactic reflects Iran's response to setbacks - above all the death of
military mastermind and Quds Force chief Qassem Soleimani, who closely
controlled Iraq's Shi'ite militia until he was killed last year by a
U.S. drone missile strike.
His successor, Esmail Ghaani, was not as familiar with Iraq's internal
politics and never exerted the same influence over the militia as
Soleimani.
Iraq's large pro-Iran militia were also forced to adopt a lower profile
after a public backlash led to huge mass demonstrations against Iranian
influence in late 2019. They were hit by divisions https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-militias/fractures-grow-among-iraq-militias-spell-political-retreat-idUSKBN21J5EZ
after Soleimani's death and seen by Iran as becoming harder to control.
But the shift to relying on smaller groups also brings tactical
advantages. They are less prone to infiltration and could prove more
effective in deploying the latest techniques Iran has developed to
strike its foes, such as armed drones.
"The new factions are linked directly to the Iranian Revolutionary
Guards Corps," an Iraqi security official said. "They take their orders
from them, not from any Iraqi side."
The account was confirmed by a second Iraqi security official, three
commanders of larger, publicly active pro-Iranian militia groups, an
Iraqi government official, a Western diplomat and a Western military
source.
"The Iranians seem to have formed new groups of individuals chosen with
great care to carry out attacks and maintain total secrecy," one of the
pro-Iran militia commanders said. "We don't know who they are."
The Iraqi security officials said at least 250 fighters had travelled to
Lebanon over several months in 2020, where advisors from Iran's IRGC and
Lebanon's Hezbollah militant group trained them to fly drones, fire
rockets, plant bombs and publicise attacks on social media.
"The new groups work in secret and their leaders, who are unknown,
answer directly to IRGC officers," one of the Iraqi security officials
said.
The Iraqi security officials and the Western sources said the new groups
were behind attacks including against U.S.-led forces at Iraq's Ain al-Asad
air base this month, Erbil International Airport in April and against
Saudi Arabia in January, all using drones laden with explosives.
Those attacks caused no casualties but alarmed Western military
officials for their sophistication.
Iranian officials and representatives of the Iraqi government, the
pro-Iran militia and the U.S. military did not reply to requests for
comment on the record. The U.S. Department of State said it was not able
to comment.
BATTLE WITH WASHINGTON
Iran is the preeminent Shi'ite Muslim power in the Middle East, and its
leverage over Iraq, the Arab world's biggest Shi'ite-majority country,
is one of the main ways it spreads its sway across the region.
It has been jockeying for influence in Iraq with the United States since
U.S. forces toppled Sunni Muslim dictator Saddam Hussein in 2003,
empowering Iraq's Shi'ites.
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Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani, the newly appointed commander of
Iran's Quds Force, reads the will of Major General Qassem Soleimani,
who was killed in a U.S. air strike at Baghdad Airport, during the
forty day memorial at the Grand Mosalla in Tehran, Iran February 13,
2020. Nazanin Tabatabaee/WANA (West Asia News Agency) via REUTERS
After Islamic State fighters swept into a third of
Iraqi territory in 2014, Washington and Tehran found themselves on
the same side, both helping the Shi'ite-led government defeat the
Sunni Muslim militants over the next three years.
The United States, which had withdrawn from Iraq in 2011, sent
thousands of troops back.
Iran, meanwhile, backed large militia groups such as Kataib
Hezbollah, Kataib Sayyed al-Shuhada and Asaib Ahl al-Haqq, each able
to deploy thousands of armed fighters and given quasi-official
status to help fight Islamic State.
But after Soleimani's death, and with protesters turning against
groups publicly linked to Iran, officials in Tehran became
suspicious of some of the militia they had promoted and grew less
supportive, according to the militia commanders.
"They (Iran) believed leaks from one of the groups helped cause
Soleimani's death, and they saw divisions over personal interests
and power among them," said one.
Another said: "Meetings and communications between us and the
Iranians have reduced. We no longer have regular meetings and
they've stopped inviting us to Iran."
The Iraqi security officials, a government official and the three
militia commanders all said the Quds Force began splitting trusted
operatives away from the main factions within months after
Soleimani's death.
The shift from supporting mass movements to relying on smaller, more
tightly controlled cadres reflects a strategy Iran has pursued
before: at the height of the U.S. occupation of Iraq in 2005-2007,
Tehran created cells that proved particularly effective at deploying
sophisticated bombs to pierce U.S. armour.
DIPLOMATIC REOPENING
Since President Joe Biden came to office, Tehran has reopened
diplomatic channels with both Washington and Riyadh. One of its main
sources of leverage in those talks is its power to strike its foes.
The drones its allies now use for attacks are far harder to defend
against and detect than regular rocket fire, increasing the danger
posed to the remaining 2,500 U.S. troops in Iraq.
General Kenneth McKenzie, head of U.S. Central Command, said in
April after the Erbil attack that Iran had made "significant
achievements" from its investment in drones.
Last year, previously unknown groups began issuing claims of
responsibility following rocket and roadside bomb attacks. Western
officials and academic reports often dismissed these new groups as
facades for Kataib Hezbollah or other familiar militia. But the
Iraqi sources said they are genuinely separate and operate
independently.
"Under (Soleimani's successor) Ghaani, they're trying to create
groups with a few hundred men from here and there, meant to be loyal
only to the Quds Force, a new generation," the Iraqi government
official said.
(Additional reporting by Baghdad newsroom; Writing by John Davison;
Editing by Peter Graff)
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